REMARKS

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BEFORE THE

EVANS-NOVAK POLITICAL FORUM

WASHINGTON, D.C.

APRIL 13, 1988

Good morning. It's a pleasure to be here. I will soon complete my first year as the Director of Central Intelligence, and it is a very interesting job. I should have brought along the button somebody gave me shortly after I took office that says: "My job is so secret that even I don't know what I'm doing."

Today, I want to talk about secrecy. It is a necessary part of effective intelligence collection. But it is, historically, that part of intelligence that has generated the most suspicion and distrust. My good friend, General Vernon Walters, the former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and now our Ambassador to the United Nations, described the view that many have about secrecy and intelligence when he said, "Americans have always had an ambivalent attitude toward intelligence. When they feel threatened, they want a lot of it, and when they don't, they tend to regard the whole thing as somewhat immoral."

I would like to talk to you briefly this morning about the role the CIA plays in supporting and implementing foreign policy -- which is not the same as making foreign policy -- and I want to discuss how the CIA's relationship with Congress has changed since the days before legislated congressional oversight. And if I have time, I'd like to discuss some of the changes that are occurring in intelligence and the challenges that we will be facing as we provide intelligence to the policy community in the future.

The CIA's primary role is to provide support to our nation's policymakers. We do that by providing intelligence that is useful, timely, and objective.

Today our government depends heavily on useful, accurate intelligence. Intelligence to formulate and implement our foreign policy, intelligence to verify the arms agreements that we have signed, and intelligence to understand both the military capabilities and the intentions of our adversaries. Intelligence is very important today as we approach confirmation of the INF agreement, and will be even more important in determining whether or not we can verify a START agreement. In fact, I think the essence of the debate -- and it has already begun to emerge on the Hill -- will be not whether the START agreement is a good idea, but whether we have the means to verify compliance with such an agreement.

Intelligence must also be timely. Last summer I had the privilege of going to NORAD at Cheyenne Mountain, the headquarters of our early warning system. The visit reminded me that intelligence in today's world is not measured only in terms of weeks or months, but often in terms of minutes. Some 24 minutes to be exact, in terms of the early warning of a nuclear attack.

Not only must intelligence be useful and timely, but it must also be objective. The Director of Central Intelligence and the people who analyze information must be seen as giving their best estimates, not as trying to "cook the books" or shape or influence policy according to our own wishes or perceptions, but to provide policymakers with the kind of information upon which they can make wise decisions in the interests of our national security.

Because the quality and objectivity of the intelligence we provide is so important, we have already taken a number of steps to ensure that the Intelligence Community preserves its objectivity and protects its integrity. We have and will continue to "tell it like it is," avoiding bias as much as we

can. On the other side of the coin, I find that rather than having a track record of cooking the books, our greatest problem is convincing the policymakers to leave our estimates alone. Sometimes they take action ahead of the estimate. Sometimes they have formed particular judgments in advance, and they don't like what they read. Sometimes, for instance with the Persian Gulf situation, they worry about our estimates implicating the War Powers Act. To all of this I have simply replied that our intelligence estimates are provided for the use of policymakers. They can be used in whole or in part. They can be ignored, torn up, or thrown away, but they may not be changed.

I think that gradually an understanding is taking full shape. We will not try to make policy, and policymakers in turn will not try to influence our estimates. I think this insistence on objectivity may very well be one of the most significant contributions that I, in my time, could make in galvanizing a coherent, cohesive Intelligence Community without compromising the integrity of the individual analysts or the program managers who depend on me to protect the integrity of their work from those who would like to alter it.

In addition to providing intelligence that is useful, timely, and objective, the CIA plays a role in implementing foreign policy. I want to emphasize again that we are not talking about CIA's foreign policy, we are talking about the foreign policy of this country. We implement policy through covert action. This may include political work through communications -- getting the message out -- training, supplying important materials for those who need our support, and giving advice. Although covert action is not defined by law, the term has come to be understood to refer to activities conducted in support of national policy in such a way that the role of the United States Government is not apparent.

Covert capability, essential in our foreign policy, provides needed support for liberation movements, often provides support to governments, and allows us to work in collaboration with those governments who do not wish, for legitimate political reasons of their own, to have the role of the United States publicly known.

From President Franklin Roosevelt forward, every President in my lifetime has endorsed and used covert action to support the foreign policy of this country. Although covert actions traditionally claim only a very small part of our resources, about 3 percent today, they are the focus of the greatest congressional and public attention.

Congress is very interested in what the CIA does. I recently talked to a group of retired intelligence officers, and they recalled the days when no classified papers went from the CIA to either branch of Congress and the only classified briefings to congressional committees were given by the Director himself, or with the Director present. At one time, the Senate Appropriations Committee had one cleared staffer, the House Appropriations Committee one or two. Today, four congressional committees closely examine the Agency's activities, and the number of individuals who see classified material far exceeds the one or two of the past.

Fifteen years ago the CIA gave 175 briefings to Congress; last year we gave over 1,000 briefings on a variety of subjects. These topics have included arms control, Soviet weapons, the Persian Gulf situation, conflicts in Central America and Afghanistan, the economic situation in Japan and China, and even the spread of AIDS in Africa. We provide information on topics of current interest to Congress, but we also like to anticipate the information

that Congress and the policy community will need to know about in the future. We provide such information in the form of National Intelligence Estimates, which are the collective work of the entire Intelligence Community, not just the CIA. Estimates are carefully assembled in an objective way. Dissenting opinions are not cast to the back of the estimate in small-print footnotes, but are carefully reflected in the text or in clear footnotes below the text so that those reading the estimates -- particularly the President -- will know the differences of opinion wherever they may exist. We do not seek the lowest common denominator of opinion, but try to reflect the best judgment of the Community as a whole. Sometimes it creates problems for policymakers and the legislature, as with differences in the estimates with respect to the SS-20, but I believe that it is the fairest way to present the total issue. When there is not total agreement, we should reflect that.

Virtually all CIA assessments go to the two congressional intelligence committees. Most also go to the Appropriations, Foreign Relations, and Armed Services Committees. Eight congressional committees get the CIA's daily national intelligence report. In the last year the CIA sent 5,000 intelligence reports to the Congress.

In addition to briefings and papers, we testify, and testify, and testify. I won't talk too much about that, but it takes an enormous amount of time. My top executives estimate they spend as much as 25 percent of their time working on congressional oversight matters. I estimate that about 15 percent of my time is spent testifying and meeting with Congress. Because I know of the need to be absolutely candid with the Congress and the responsibility that intelligence professionals have to protect their sources

and methods, I have established written guidelines governing our dealings with the Congress. And I have made it absolutely clear that in dealing with Congress there is no excuse for deception.

There may be questions on which Agency officials who brief Congress will have to demur and say they are not authorized to answer. They will report back to Headquarters, and sometimes the question will be brought to my desk. I have one there right now. I will take the heat or work out arrangements with Congress. But we will not give half-answers or around-the-corner answers. If there is a problem with answering, we will say there is a problem and we cannot answer the question at this time, and we'll tell them why. We may ultimately have to provide an answer, and it may mean negotiation. But we will not leave the Congress feeling that in some way anyone in the CIA has been disingenuous in dealing with them. And there's a reason for this.

I firmly believe that the oversight responsibilities exercised by Congress are both necessary and beneficial. There must be a dependable system of oversight and accountability which builds, rather than erodes, trust between those who have the intelligence responsibility and those who are the elected representatives of the American people.

As part of my effort to establish an open relationship with the Congress, I meet with the leaders of the committees at least monthly. The Members of Congress share with the Intelligence Community the responsibility of preserving the nation's secrets.

I've been talking a good deal about disclosures in the oversight process. Now I'd like to say a few words about secrecy.

It seems quite clear to me that it would be impossible to carry out the clandestine activities properly authorized and assigned to us -- either to collect information or to carry out covert action -- without secrecy.

Both Congress and the judiciary have recognized the need for secrecy in matters of national security. The main purpose of secrecy is to preserve and protect sources and methods. If we cannot protect our sources, we will not get the information that we need. It's that simple. If we cannot protect the sensitive methods by which we collect the information -- whether on the ground or from satellites in space -- we will cease to have the means for collecting information. On Monday night I spoke to the Board of Directors of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. I told them that it isn't always important if leaked information is accurate. Even inaccurate leaks of secret sensitive subjects provide an opportunity for our adversaries. Often, millions and in some cases, billions, of dollars invested in intelligence collection capabilities go out the window because of such leaks, which allow the adversary to become aware of our capabilities. For example, loose talk about classified cables can result in making an adversary aware that we have broken his code, and we lose the capability for a substantial period of time.

I mentioned earlier the number of briefings and documents that we provide Congress yearly. What I did not discuss were the laws defining the nature of the relationship between Congress and intelligence -- the laws that tell us what to provide and when to provide it. I would like to try to summarize that very briefly so that I can take some of your questions.

We are governed both by the Intelligence Oversight Act and the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, which require that Congress be kept fully and currently informed of intelligence activities.

With respect to covert action, the President must first find that each covert action is important to the national security before the operation can be initiated. Currently pending is legislation requiring that the Congress be notified within 48 hours of a Presidential finding. A National Security Decision Directive already requires that the President, except in the rarest of circumstances, provide such notice within 48 hours. And in fact, over the last decade we can recall only three instances -- all involving Iran -- in which the Congress had not been informed within 48 hours. We have been arguing, so far unsuccessfully, that a rigid adherence to the 48-hour rule exposes us to situations in which other cooperating intelligence agencies, or other sources in life-threatening situations may make it difficult -- if not impossible -- for us to carry out the action if we are required to give 48 hours' notice. I think that the problem that occurred in the Iran-Contra situation has been largely addressed in the President's National Security Decision Directive, in which he now requires -- as I have always urged -- a review of the decision to delay congressional notice, and every ten days, a new decision must be made. I think this is adequate protection. Whether or not Congress will agree remains to be seen. I think that the majority of both houses probably favor the statutory bill. If the President should wish to veto it, there will be a serious question of whether or not the Congress would override such a veto.

I'd like to say that what we do before the President makes the decision on that finding is equally important. Before submitting a covert action proposal to the President, we in the Intelligence Community have a responsibility to determine that it can be done--and done in a lawful way. And we must be sure

that the individuals who are out on the firing line -- our agents and our officers -- who are outside the protection of our Constitution and our laws in many instances, can do their work with the flexibility that they need, and with the clearest understanding of their responsibilities to the CIA and to our country.

Before we propose a covert action, it's reviewed carefully by a group called CARG, the Covert Action Review Group, inside the CIA. During this review, we ask ourselves a number of questions. In addition to asking if we can do it and do it lawfully, we ask whether the action is consistent with our overt foreign policy. We ask ourselves whether it's consistent with our understanding of American values. And, if it becomes public, we ask if the action will make sense to the American people. Only when we've been able to satisfy ourselves on all these questions or have adjusted the program so that it will be consistent with these questions, do we submit the issue to the National Security Council. And here again, all of the President's chief advisers -- the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the advisor to the President for national security, the Secretary of the Treasury, Attorney General, and others who may be involved in a particular project -- have an opportunity to express their views before the President makes the final decision. Then, of course, the Congress is informed. This is a very good procedure for developing a workable, justifiable program. I have found no comparable procedure in any other country in the world.

There has been a dramatic increase in the number and diversity of subjects that the Intelligence Community is required to address today. While much of our effort is still focused on the Soviet Union, we are spending more time and

resources collecting information on Third World nations. We are interested in both the political and the economic stability of countries from Brazil to Bangladesh, from Mexico to Malaysia, and from Turkey to Tanzania. We are also concentrating and spending increasingly large amounts of time on interdisciplinary problems such as international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and technology transfer.

We believe the Soviet Union's appetite for American technology is growing, particularly in the area of information technology. The Soviet strategy appears to be modernizing the electronics-based sector of the economy before moving on to invest more heavily, in the 1990s, in military production facilities. We have every reason to believe that Soviet industrial espionage will intensify in the next decade. And the Soviets will continue to devote whatever resources and manpower are necessary to fulfill their most critical military collection requirements.

Issues like technology transfer have changed our own collection requirements. That's why we must continue to attract the top people to help us. We are fortunate in that last year, over 100,000 men and women expressed an interest in coming to work for the Central Intelligence Agency. You have no doubt read about the protests on some college campuses about CIA recruiting. I think it's interesting that these protests and the publicity they generate often work in our favor. Our recruitment centers are inundated with resumes after campus demonstrations. But I want to add that we're not responsible for the demonstrations.

Over this past weekend, after a lengthy debate, the faculty of Colby College was voted down by the student body on the subject of CIA campus

recruitment. The students voted to allow CIA recruiters to have access to their campus, and the trustees supported their decision. We can get along without Colby, but we don't want to. We are getting 1,000 serious applications and calls by people every month and I'm very pleased with that show of interest for an unusual and tremendously rewarding career.

I hope that we continue to attract those best suited to carry out our mission -- those who are risk takers but not risk seekers, people who are dedicated and responsive to our law and our discipline, people who understand and play by the rules. People to whom fame and fortune are not particularly a necessary part of their lives, but who can find in our work an avenue to pursue their highest aspirations for a safer and better world. I think we're getting the right combination today, people with confidence, curiosity, courage, dedication and discipline to do the job. This is what you would want from us, what the American people would want from us, and we are doing our very best to supply it.

Thank you.